Introduction
The macroeconomic eects of the Bank of England's monetary policy during the classical gold standard was a subject of great interest to contemporaries. A long line of economic historians have revisited the subject since such as Tinbergen (1950) , Pesmazoglu (1951) , Ford (1962) , Andréadès (1966) , Goodhart (1972) and Sayers (1976) . At one end of the spectrum, Sayers argues that it did not matter, while at the other, Andréadès notes that it had very injurious eects.
Quantitative estimates are few and far between in the literature. Jeanne (1995) estimated a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) for the British economy in this period. The results show that a contractionary monetary shock lowered output proxies but raised prices in this period -the so-called price puzzle. A recent review of estimates of the ecacy of monetary policy in modern economies based on this methodology nds that one-third of studies suer from the same problem (Rusnak et al., 2013) .
In a classic paper, Romer and Romer (2004) address the price puzzle using a new methodology: the narrative approach. In the rst stage, the central bank's reaction function is 1 estimated using data that was available to policymakers in real time. The residuals from this regression constitute exogenous monetary policy shocks. In the second stage, this new measure is used to estimate the macroeconomic eects of monetary policy. The narrative approach improves on traditional SVARs as the full information set can be controlled for, while in the latter degrees of freedom quickly vanish with the inclusion of additional variables. Romer and Romer (2004) show that a contractionary monetary shock has a signicant, negative impact on output and prices in the modern US economy, which is consistent with New Keynesian models and sticky prices. However, the narrative approach has only been applied in one other context. Cloyne and Hürtgen (2016) nd qualitatively similar results for the modern UK economy. This paper therefore contributes to this literature as only the third application of the narrative approach to monetary policy, and the rst for a historical period and an alternative monetary regime.
The choice of sample period under investigation is informed by three considerations. Firstly, the underlying sources are not consistent until 1890. Secondly, previous research on the Bank's reaction function during the classical gold standard covers the same years (Morys, 2013; Davutyan and Parke, 1995; Giovannini, 1986; Dutton, 1984; Pippenger, 1984) . Thirdly, the targets and actions of the Bank were relatively stable during this period. It was a period in which the Bank only watched the gold and took the necessary steps automatically (Giuseppi, 1966) .
The results of the analysis show that monetary policy did matter. In response to a one percentage point monetary tightening, unemployment increased by up to 0.8 percentage points, while ination fell by up to 2.7 percentage points. In addition, monetary policy shocks accounted for as much as 28% of unemployment volatility and 27% of ination volatility. This paper also contributes to another literature. Orphanides (2001) argues that the interpretation of historical monetary policy rules hinges on the use of real-time data. There is a long literature that estimates the Bank of England's reaction function during the classical gold standard that includes data that was not available to policymakers and/or excludes important information that was (Morys, 2013; Davutyan and Parke, 1995; Giovannini, 1986; Dutton, 1984; Pippenger, 1984) . The rst stage of the narrative approach boils down to the estimation of the central bank's reaction function. In light of the Orphanides criticism, a real-time information set for all 1,257 monetary policy decisions between 1890 and 1913 is reconstructed from archival sources. This will be a useful resource for future research.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches a brief historical and theoretical background. Sections 3 and 4 cover the methodology and data. Section 5 derives the new measure of monetary shocks and explores some of its properties. Section 6 analyzes the causal eect of monetary policy shocks on the macroeconomy. Section 7 investigates the 2 robustness of the baselines results. Section 8 concludes.
Background

History
In order to understand monetary policy in Britain during the classical gold standard, it is important to grasp the objectives of its conductor, the Bank of England. As Sayers (1976) put it, the Bank ran three horses at the same time. The rst was the protection of the country's gold reserves; the second was the nancing of the government; and the third was the commercial duty to the stockholders. However, if there was a clash, then the rst objective came above the others.
In pursuit of its objectives, the Bank of England's primary instrument was Bank Rate (Goodhart et al., 1994) : the rate at which it lent to the banking system (Capie and Webber, 1985) . There is evidence that the Bank also used open market operations and gold devices (Sayers, 1976) . However, as Eichengreen et al. (1985) argue, Bank Rate was the most visible and controversial of the Bank's instruments, and as such is the variable most likely, when subjected to detailed analysis, to yield information on the pressures and considerations inuencing the formulation of policy.
Theory
In theory, monetary policy should not be eective under xed exchange rates. Consider a monetary expansion in which the central bank purchases government bonds. In this instance, the money supply increases, which drives down the nominal interest rate. In a world free from expected exchange rate depreciation, risk premiums and transaction costs, investors sell domestic currency to the central bank to reap the higher reward overseas. This reduces the money supply and increases the nominal interest rate back to their original levels.
In practice, a number of imperfections undermined this mechanism during the classical gold standard. Firstly, the exchange rate was not rigidly xed, but uctuated within the gold points. The $/¿ exchange rate, for example, uctuated between 4.84 and 4.91 between 1890 and 1913 (Thomas and Dimsdale, 2016) . Klein and Shambaugh (2015) show that a degree of exibility allows for some monetary autonomy. Secondly, risk premiums were not equal across countries. Bordo and Rocko (2009) nd that countries on the gold standard enjoyed lower risk premiums than those that were not, while Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) show that core countries beneted from lower premiums relative to the periphery. Thirdly, and this is related to the rst point, transaction costs were not zero. In the case of gold ows between Britain and the US, the cost of arbitrage was between 0.4 and 0.8 per cent of the nominal value (Ocer, 1986) . In summary, Ocer (1986) nds that the interest rate parity condition did not hold between, at least, Britain and the US, despite both being core countries on the gold standard. As such, there would have been scope for exogenous changes in Bank Rate during the classical gold standard.
Methodology
The Identication Problem
A reasonable rst step towards the estimation of the eects of monetary policy might be to regress a macroeconomic variable of interest, x t , on a measure of monetary policy, i t :
However, then as now, monetary policy systematically reacted to current macroeconomic conditions, which we might simply model as:
It is clear that there is an issue of reverse causality here, which arises from the fact that monetary policy simultaneously aects macroeconomic outcomes in equation 1 while macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously aect monetary policy in equation 2. The simple estimation of equation 1 will therefore lead to biased estimates of β 1 . To see why, recall a variant of the formula for the OLS estimate of β 1 :
The parameterβ 1 is equal to the true parameter β 1 plus the covariance between the independent variable and the error term. In order for OLS to yield unbiased estimates ofβ 1 , that isβ 1 = β 1 , the covariance between the independent variable and the error term must be zero, i.e., Cov(i t , t ) = 0, or the variance of i t must be explosive. This, of course, is one of the Gauss-Markov assumptions underlying OLS.
This assumption is not met, however, in the case of equation 1. Let x t be a measure of output and assume that the central bank leans against the wind, i.e., γ 1 > 0. In the case of a positive shock to t , a demand shock for example, x t will rise in equation 1 , which in turn raises i t in both equations 1 and 2. Thus, the Cov(i t , t ) = 0. In fact, Cov(i t , t ) > 0. As a result of this positive covariance and the expectation that β 1 < 0, equation 3 implies that β 1 will be downwardly biased towards zero. Therefore, the simple estimation of equation 1 will underestimate the eects of monetary policy. 
Narrative Identication
An interesting solution to the endogeneity problem is the narrative approach developed by Romer and Romer (2004) . The procedure involves two stages. In the rst stage, the policy instrument, i t , is regressed on the information set available to the central bank, Ω t . Thus, equation 2 becomes:
In doing so, the endogenous component of monetary policy that systematically reacts to information regarding the current and future state of the economy is captured by the function f (. 
Bank Rate
The dates of monetary policy decisions are tied with their outcome using archival sources that recorded the prevailing level of Bank Rate at the end of each day (Bank of England Archive, C1/38-61). The nal series was checked against Hawtrey (1938) and is plotted in gure 1.
Information Set
The narrative identication approach requires an accurate, real-time approximation of the policymakers' information set at the time of each monetary policy decision. According to Sayers (1976) , the Daily Accounts, which contained exact information, kept up to date 
where all variables are measured at a decision-by-decision frequency denoted by subscript m.
The dependent variable, ∆i m , is the change in Bank Rate (percentage points). In terms of the independent variables, i m−1 is the level of Bank Rate at the previous meeting (percentage points), which has been included to capture recent macroeconomic conditions (Cloyne and Hürtgen, 2016) and any tendency toward mean reversion (Romer and Romer, 2004) . ∆B m is the change in the total bullion held by the Bank of England (%), which is measured as the sum of gold and silver coin and bullion in the Banking and Issue departments. P m is the proportion (%), which is dened as the Banking Department's reserve of notes and coin to the sum of its deposits and post bills. ∆i To arrive at this specication, I run Phillips-Perron tests to determine if the variables contain unit roots. I(1) variables are transformed into rst dierences or growth rates. In some cases, I also transform stationary variables as they yield more information than in levels, which implies that the Court were inuenced by changes or rates of change.
In terms of model dynamics, I appeal to information criteria to inform the selection of lags. The BIC is minimized with no lags while the AIC is minimized with three lags. In this specication of the rst stage regression, I side with the BIC in order to estimate fewer parameters. For the implications of alternative variations of the rst stage regression on the baseline results, see section 7.1.
1 On the occasions that a range was given, the minimum was used. This is consistent with the treatment of Bank Rate, which was considered to be the minimum rate of discount. See Bank of England Archive (G15/97) for internal evidence. 
Determinants of Changes in Bank Rate
The results from the estimation of equation 5 are reported in table 1. The coecient on the initial level of Bank Rate is negative, as in Romer and Romer (2004) and Cloyne and Hürtgen (2016) , and is statistically signicant. The sign implies a tendency towards mean reversion as opposed to a consideration of recent macroeconomic conditions. As expected, the coecients on the Bank's holdings of bullion and the proportion are negative and statistically signicant as in Goodhart (1972) and Pippenger (1984) , which implies that Bank Rate was increased (decreased) in response to declining (increasing) reserves. The positive coecient on the net exports of gold coin and bullion implies that Bank
Rate was raised (lowered) in response to an eux (inux) of gold, as in Jeanne (1995) and Pippenger (1984) , which is consistent with the rules of the game. Bank Rate was also 8 increased (lowered) in response to a decrease (increase) in the price of consols. As the price of bonds is negatively related to the yield, this can be interpreted as a positive association between the long-term market rate of interest and Bank Rate.
The nal two rows have a bearing on an enduring debate in economy history: the degree to which the Bank of England ran a countercyclical monetary policy during the classical gold standard (Jeanne, 1995; Dutton, 1984; Bloomeld, 1959) . Bank clearings (Klovland, 1998 ) and the price of wheat (Campbell et al., forthcoming; Rostow, 1948) are sometimes considered as economic fundamentals in the nineteenth century. Wheat, in particular, was an important determinant of workers' real wages (Campbell et al., forthcoming) . It was these variables that the Bank of England monitored on a weekly basis, as opposed to ex-post constructed monthly unemployment or ination series that are staples of previous research on the reaction function. The statistical insignicance of bank clearings and the price of wheat implies that the Bank of England had little concern for the general macroeconomy over and above its core objectives.
5.3 Constructing the New Shock Series
The inclusion of the information set in equation 5 purges the endogenous component of monetary policy changes. As such, the residual is a measure of exogenous monetary policy shocks. However, it is currently measured at a decision-by-decision frequency. In order to transform the residuals into a monthly series, I match the shock with the month in which it occurred. In months with multiple decisions, I sum the shocks, following Romer and Romer (2004) and Cloyne and Hürtgen (2016) . The new measure of monetary policy shocks, m t , is shown in gure 2.
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was particularly persuasive at a given meeting, then Bank Rate might be changed by more than average, given current macroeconomic conditions. Ogden (1991) 
Predictability of the Shocks
In order to remove any suspicion that the new series of monetary policy innovations might be endogenous, I test to see if the series is predictable from current and lagged macroeconomic variables, as in Cloyne and Hürtgen (2016) and Coibion (2012) . The inclusion of contemporaneous values is in line with the identifying assumptions used in the next section.
Specically, I regress the monetary shocks, m t , on a macroeconomic variable of interest, x t :
The results from estimating equation 6 are shown in table 2. Alternative specications are reported, the rst with 3 lags (Cloyne and Hürtgen, 2016) ; the second with 6 lags (Cloyne and Hürtgen, 2016; Coibion, 2012) . The macroeconomic variables of interest are the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, the 12 month wholesale price ination rate and the 12 month share price ination rate. Unemployment and ination are included as these will be the dependent variables in the second stage analysis. A thorough discussion of these variables is delayed until then. Share price ination has been included to gauge whether nancial markets predicted the shock. New research shows that changes in monetary policy inuenced share prices in nineteenth-century Britain (Campbell et al., forthcoming) . Therefore, if nancial markets could have predicted the monetary shock, one would expect that share prices would move in anticipation of the shock itself.
In all cases, the large P -values indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. As a result, the new series is appropriate to identify the macroeconomic eects of monetary policy. As in a number of studies on this subject, for example Cloyne and Hürtgen (2016) , Coibion (2012) , Bernanke et al. (2005) and Romer and Romer (1989) , unemployment is included in the model to gauge the real eects of monetary policy. It is preferred over other candidates in this instance, such as GDP or industrial production, simply because the alternatives are not available at a monthly or quarterly frequency. The unemployment series, based on the work of Denman and McDonald (1996) in Thomas and Dimsdale (2016) , measures the percentage of trade union members unemployed. It has been seasonally adjusted using a Census X-13 lter. However, there are two breaks in the series in 1912: the rst in March due to a labour dispute (Klovland, 1998) The measure of prices, based on the work of Sauerbeck in Thomas and Dimsdale (2016) , is the 12 month percentage change of the wholesale price index for all commodities. A limitation of the series is that it is an unweighted average of 45 commodities. However, Sauerbeck weighted the series implicitly by entering two or more items for particularly important articles (Klovland, 1993) . Klovland evaluated the weighting schemes of alternative indices for the nineteenth century such as that of Gayer et al. (1975) , The Economist and the Board of Trade with the conclusion that the Sauerbeck index seems to be the most representative general price index for the period before the First World War.
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In spite of the evidence supporting the exogeneity of the monetary shocks, a structural VAR is used for three reasons. Firstly, the estimation of a VAR is a belt and braces approach to the endogeneity problem. Secondly, Cloyne and Hürtgen (2016) argue that the inclusion of lagged dependent variables and controlling for other shocks may yield more precise estimates in short samples. Thirdly, it is in line with, and therefore comparable to, the rest of the narrative literature concerned with the eects of monetary policy (Cloyne and Hürtgen, 2016; Romer and Romer, 2004) . In section 7.4, I consider an alternative econometric approach.
The details of the model are:
where B(L) is a polynomial lag operator with P lags and X t is the vector of variables.
Specically, X t = [u t , π t , shock t ] . The measure of monetary policy is the cumulative sum of shocks, shock t = t i=0 m i , which is conventional (Cloyne and Hürtgen, 2016; Coibion, 2012; Romer and Romer, 2004) as the wider VAR literature is based on the level of the policy rate. The remaining aspects of the specication are identical to Cloyne and Hürtgen (2016) .
In terms of lag selection, I include 24 lags. As to identication, I order the cumulated shock measure last. This assumption implies that the shock does not contemporaneously aect, but is rather aected by, unemployment and ination. In section 7.3, I demonstrate that the baseline results are robust to alternative lag lengths and timing assumptions.
Impulse Responses
The main results of the paper are shown in gures 4 and 5. Impulse responses from the baseline VAR are plotted along with 95 per cent (2 standard deviation) condence intervals.
In response to a one percentage point contractionary monetary policy shock, unemployment increased by up to 0.82 percentage points (t = 2.83). This was a relatively slow-burning process, with no discernible impact for around 6 months, after which a peak was reached in month 18 and a decay toward zero followed. The eect is statistically signicant between months 13 and 21. In terms of the narrative literature, the peak unemployment eect lies somewhere between Cloyne and Hürtgen's (2016) analysis of the modern UK economy, where the maximum response was a little more than 0.1 percentage points, and Romer and Romer's (1989) analysis of the post-war US economy, where it was 2.1 percentage points.
The relatively long lag in the transmission of the real eects of monetary policy is also consistent with the the previous narrative literature.
Similarly, in response to a one percentage point contractionary monetary policy shock, the ination rate fell by up to 2.69 percentage points (t = −3.15). The response of ination was also somewhat protracted, beginning to decline after 6 months, peaking at 15 months and then zzling out. The eect is statistically signicant between months 10 and 19. In terms of the narrative literature, the peak ination eect also sits centrally in the range of previous estimates. Cloyne and Hürtgen (2016) , for example, nd that ination falls by roughly 1 percentage point, while Romer and Romer (2004) estimate that the price level declines by up to 5.9 per cent. While an outside lag of 6 months is far from instantaneous, it is a good deal less sluggish than the response for contemporary economies. In both Cloyne and Hürtgen's (2016) and Romer and Romer's (2004) analyses, ination is sticky around zero for roughly 2 years before contracting. Figure 6 plots the impulse response of the cumulated shock series to a one percentage point innovation to itself. The new measure falls by more than half its initial level after six months and fades to zero after roughly a year and a half. This persistence is evidence of a degree of monetary autonomy during the classical gold standard as exogenous changes were not immediately oset. However, in Romer and Romer's (2004) analysis for the modern US economy, the shock takes roughly a year to fall by half and persists above zero for 4 years.
This greater degree of persistence may account for the larger eects that they nd. 3 Therefore, in combination with the results from the impulse responses, it seems that monetary policy did matter.
3 See Ramey (2016) for a discussion of a broad range of macroeconomic shocks. In total, 69 responses were received. Table 3 reports a summary of the responses, based on earlier work by Moggridge (1972) . The results show that more than two-thirds of replies cited a negative impact of some description following a monetary tightening, while just 5.8 per cent responded that there were would be no signicant eects. Therefore, the VAR results are in line with the views of businesses at the time.
Monetary policy aects the macroeconomy through some or all of the following channels:
the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, the credit channel or through other asset price eects (Mishkin, 1995) . If these mechanisms were underdeveloped or lacking entirely in the British economy during the classical gold standard, then this would be dicult to reconcile with the VAR results. However, the replies to the survey point to a number of classic mechanisms that alleviate such a concern.
The interest rate channel, for example, features strongly. It is through this channel that monetary policy aects investment and consumption via its aect on the real interest rate.
In the survey responses, reason (2) explicitly describes a decline in investment, while reasons (4) and (5) implicitly describe a decline in investment. Similarly, adverse expectations of consumption were cited in 15.9 per cent of replies. The implication of reduced investment and consumption is lower aggregate demand, which raises unemployment and lowers prices.
The interest rate channel was particularly well-greased during the classical gold standard.
Eichengreen (1992) explains:
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Bank of England's ability to inuence market rates was widely acknowledged and increasingly institutionalized.
Banks rst in London and then throughout the country began to index their loan and overdraft rates to Bank Rate. London banks xed their deposit rates 1.5
percentage points below Bank Rate. Rates on new loans were indexed to Bank
Rate at a higher level, while those on xtures (long-term loans to the discount market) were similarly indexed at 0.5 percent above the deposit rate.
The indexation of market interest rates to Bank Rate also extended to the rates of other institutions, such as building societies and nance houses (Capie and Webber, 1985) , and out to longer maturities (Eichengreen, 1987) . In line with the survey responses, the Bank of England was able to inuence the interest rates upon which a broad spectrum of consumption and investment decisions were made
In addition, reasons (7) and (8) indicate that the Bank was also able to inuence ination expectations. As consumption and investment decisions are ultimately based on the real interest rate (nominal rate minus ination expectations), this would have further amplied the interest rate channel.
Reason (6) points to a functional credit channel in the transmission of monetary policy.
As Bank Rate was the rate at which the Bank lent to the banking system, a change would aect the quantity of reserves available to commercial banks. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) explain that when the central bank reduces the volume of reserves, and therefore of loans, spending by customers who depend on bank credit must fall, and therefore so must aggregate demand.
While not explicitly mentioned in the survey results, the movement in exchange rates aorded by the gold points allowed for a limited exchange rate channel. A contractionary monetary shock would have attracted capital from the rest of the world. As a result, the demand for pounds would have increased, leading to an appreciation of the exchange rate.
As such, net exports would have fallen, resulting in a reduction of aggregate demand. investment goods for a given issue of equity (Mishkin, 1995) . Secondly, in the late nineteenth century, Britain was a nation of shareholders (Rutterford et al., 2011) . for example, are reported to have been monitored by the Bank (Sayers, 1976) , but were excluded previously as they were a major component of the proportion. Other variables, such as gold coined by the Royal Mint, net exports of silver bullion, the price of French government bonds, the price of US government bonds, the price of silver and the price of London and North Western Railway consolidated stock -the largest company at the time (Hickson et al., 2011) , were also included in the Daily Accounts but excluded in the rst stage regression because they had not been cited in the literature as determinants of Bank
Rate. Panel A of gure 7 plots the results from the baseline VAR (solid line) alongside the results using the residuals from a rst stage regression that includes the extra variables (starred line). In the rst stage regression, these variables were not statistically signicant.
As such, it is unsurprising that their inclusion has no discernible eect on the results. A possible concern is that the rst stage regression included too few lags. After all, it is plausible that the Court of Directors acted on a run of data, rather than the current week's gures alone. Panel B reports the results using the residuals from a rst stage regression with the number of lags determined information criteria. This specication is based on the minimization of the AIC (three lags). The results are somewhat larger than the baseline with a peak response for unemployment of 0.98 per cent (t = 3.27) and ination of -2.74 (t = −3.09).
Previous narrative studies have not accounted for potential asymmetries in the central bank's reaction function. It is plausible, for instance, that holding ination constant, the central bank might alter the policy rate more strongly to negative output growth than to positive. The same could also be true in a historical context. Davutyan and Parke (1995) In line with the convention in narrative VARs (Cloyne and Hürtgen, 2016; Coibion, 2012; Romer and Romer, 2004) , the measure of monetary shocks was ordered last. However, if the shocks are exogenous, as the evidence in section 5.5 suggests, then the shocks should actually be ordered rst. This assumption implies that that the shocks are not aected by, but rather aect, unemployment and ination contemporaneously. Panel B of gure 9 presents the results from a VAR with the measure of monetary policy shocks ordered rst.
It is clear that the results are not materially sensitive to this assumption. 
for h = 0, 1, 2 . . . , where x t is unemployment or ination, z t−1 is a vector of control variables, Ψ h (L) is a polynomial lag operator and m t is the new series of monetary policy innovations.
The vector of control variables includes 24 lags of the shock measure, unemployment and ination. As Ramey and Zubairy (forthcoming) explain, the coecient β h gives the response of x at time t + h to the shock at time t. Thus, one constructs the impulse responses as a sequence of the β h 's estimated in a series of single regressions for each horizon. The standard errors are Newey-West corrected, with the maximum autocorrelation lag L = h+1, as in Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) . show that the main results are robust to a number of alternative specications. In terms of unemployment, the smallest peak eect was 0.54 per cent, while the largest was 0.98. The median peak was 0.81, which is very close to the baseline gure of 0.82. In terms of ination, the smallest peak eect was -1.91 per cent, while the largest was -2.87. The median peak was -2.59, which is in the region of the baseline gure of -2.69. Additionally, the peak eect for each variable and variant of the model was signicant at the 5 per cent level. The sample covers all monetary policy decisions between 1890 and 1913.
